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1. INTRODUCTION
Arthur Laffer’s seminal discussion of the relation between tax revenues and “the” tax
rate was an analytical cornerstone of the supply-side economics revolution during the
early 1980s (see Canto, Joines, and Laffer [1982]). The conjecture that if tax rates
were reduced tax revenues would increase has become a powerful, suggestive policy
stand. The surprising policy implication was that public funds could be increased
without burdening the private sector by adverse incentive effects or redistributive
measures. The Laffer relation provided an important theoretical ingredient for the
formulation of a convincing hypothesis about the behavior of a Leviathan government
in the guise of a revenue-maximizing bureaucracy. It was as early as 1982 when
Buchanan and his collaborators used the Laffer relation to analyze the behavior of
political agents and derived the conditions for political equilibrium (see especially
Buchanan and Lee [1982a and 1982b]).
1
However, the Laffer curve – quite similar to the favorite policy toy of the
Keynesian economists “the Phillips curve” – has basically remained an intuitively
perceptive ad hoc relation.
2 Our paper „Explorations of the Laffer curve“ aims at
clarifying the theoretical ingredients for deriving such a curve. It is our understanding3
that the Laffer curve should be interpreted as a reduced-form equation of the
economic process, an assertion which is only meaningful if the underlying economic
structure is explicitly formulated. To illustrate some of the theoretical issues the
argument will be simplified by relying on a one-period equilibrium model based on a
representative agent. The tax system is as simple as possible: the tax base is easily
identified and the tax rate (either income taxes or value-added taxes) is constant and
proportionally related to the tax base.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 restates the simple (basically ad
hoc) Laffer curve and introduces some analytics to justify the curvature properties by
stating the underlying sufficient conditions. In Section 3 the Laffer curve is derived
from the equilibrium conditions for the labor market. This semi-reduced form is
substantiated by the fact that a wealth effect and thereby a profit term remains
excluded. As in the implicit procedure of standard macroeconomics we rely on a so-
called no-wealth-effect utility function. The Laffer curve derived is based on the idea
that the equilibrium employment level depends on the prevailing wage rate. We
demonstrate that income taxes and value-added taxes are equivalent, thereby
exemplifying the irrelevance-of-who-pays principle. It is our understanding that the
Laffer curve can only be a useful policy instrument if it is derived from an underlying
Laffer-type relation between the tax base and the tax rate. Otherwise, the optimal size
of government remains zero, which is not a convincing starting point. Section 4
introduces government productive activity in the form of a public good operating
parametrically as an infrastructure component. The employment level is constant but
can be allocated in variable proportions to the private and the public sectors. The
government budget constraint affects this allocation and enables to derive a Laffer
curve. The simple model excludes a leisure-income trade-off, which could allow a
potential outright confiscation of the total private product by a Leviathan government.
We ignore such a theoretical possibility. Government activity in the form of a public
good both as an argument of the utility function of the representative consumer and a
factor enhancing the productivity of the private sector extends the analysis in a crucial
way and makes it possible to derive a multitude of Laffer-type relations, thereby
providing a stronger empirical plausibility for the hypothesis of a revenue-
maximizing bureaucracy (Section 5). The general equilibrium model supporting this
analysis is summarized in an appendix. To complete the analysis, a model of a
revenue-maximizing bureaucracy based on the extended Laffer curve is discussed in
Section 6. A short summary (Section 7) completes the paper.
2. THE SIMPLE LAFFER CURVE
A familiar theorem from elementary calculus is Rolle’s Theorem which can be stated
simply as follows: if a curve crosses the abscissa twice then there must be a point
between the crossings where the tangent to the curve is parallel to the axis. Of course,
the function describing the curve between the points must be continuous and the first
derivative must exist. Figure 1 describes a special case which could easily be
interpreted as a Laffer curve if the variable on the abscissa denotes the tax rate and the
variable on the ordinate the tax revenues. The latter variable is clearly zero if the tax4
rate as a multiplying factor is zero. If the tax rate is equal to one, one might expect
that the return from supplying labor services is zero. The consequence will be that
economic agents withdraw from market activities and possibly concentrate on shadow
activities. Thus, the two crossings along the abscissa are intuitively substantiated. For
the moment, we should ignore the explicit scale along the ordinate of both Figures 1
and 2 discussed below.
Figure 1. The Laffer Curve
Tax revenues are the product of the tax rate, t, and the tax base, x, written as a
function of the tax rate (see Figure 1). If we assume that the tax base is a decreasing
function of the tax rate, the simple Laffer curve seems to be established (see Canto,
Joines, and Webb, [ 1982] ).
3
The two curves are related in a way that is familiar from elementary price theory if
we interpret the tax rate as a price variable and the relation between the tax base and
the tax rate as a standard demand function. However, this interpretation is misleading
because it will be shown that this function is a reduced-form equation and not a
structural equation. Thus, switching the axes is no violation of the Marshallian
convention. Tax revenues have a maximum where the marginal tax revenue is zero
which implies the familiar elasticity condition of minus unity for the underlying curve
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The Relation between the Tax Base and the Tax Rate
The neat curvature of the Laffer curve follows from the concave function between the
tax base and the tax rate. A sufficient condition for a unique maximum of the Laffer
curve is derived from a theorem noted by Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff (1991):
4
if 1/ ( ) xt is convex then  tx t ( ) is quasi-concave. In our case, the function  ) (t x  not
only has a negative slope but is concave, too, which a fortiori strengthens the
theorem.
3. LABOR DEMAND, LABOR SUPPLY, AND THE LAFFER CURVE
One way to derive a Laffer curve is to focus on the labor market. The reasoning is
simple: if the marginal (and the average) tax rate is one, the households have no
incentive to supply labor because the net wage rate is zero. Similarly, if the marginal
tax rate for the producers is equal to one, the corresponding net price is zero, thus
preventing a positive supply of goods.
Before we derive a Laffer curve we show that an income tax and a value-added tax
are equivalent, thereby illustrating the principle of the-irrelevance-of-who-pays. Of6
course, this irrelevance presupposes both utility and profit maximizing behavior and
price responsiveness for labor demand and supply.
If we start from a so-called no-wealth-effects utility function which excludes a
wealth effect from the labor supply function, it is easy to derive a general equilibrium
model relating output, x, “the” tax rate, t, and the employment level, 
w y.
The generic type of the underlying utility function is:











To simplify further we use the special case of  θ→ 1:
) ln(
w p y R x U − + = .
p x  denotes the privately absorbed output. The difference between total time
endowment, R, and work time, 
w y , defines time used for leisure. The income-tax
model includes the following private budget constraint:
p w x t wy t = π − + − ) 1 ( ) 1 (.
Here and during the discussion of the paper the consumer price for output will be set
equal to one. The gross wage rate is w and the profit level π which, given the












The inverse form of the production function is
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Finally, the government budget constraint shows that discretionary government
expenditures have to be financed by taxes. Because the model excludes any
productive activity of the central government, the government budget constraint does
not include a wage component, which is the subject of the next section:
g x tx = .
The model comprises seven independent equations to determine seven endogenous
variables, (U, 
p x , 
g x , x, 
w y , π , w), given the income tax rate, t. However, the no-
wealth-effect utility function allows a simple solution. Equating labor supply and
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This equation defines the implicit form of the relation between the tax base and the
tax rate behind the Laffer curve.
Figure 3. Labor Market Equilibrium: Income-Tax Regime
A value-added tax system is equivalent to the one stated. Multiplying both sides by
() , 1− t where t will now denote the marginal value-added tax rate yields the same
equilibrium condition for the labor market: income taxation and value-added taxation
are equivalent regimes and describe what is known as the-irrelevance-of-who-pays
principle. Figure 3 shows the labor market equilibrium. Using the numerical values8
for the parameters, we derive the following explicit form for the relation between the











The graph of this function is shown in Figure 2.
The supply and demand curves in Figure 3 are so-called basic curves excluding the
tax rate. Introducing either type of the tax rate will shift the labor market equilibrium
to the left by shifting either the demand or the supply curve. The principle of the-
irrelevance-of-who-pays allows a simple graphical interpretation. If taxes are
included, the equilibrium employment level will decrease. In the case of an income-
tax regime, the vertical difference between the two curves identifies the marginal tax
rate in value terms, i.e., wt. The demand price is the gross wage rate and the supply
price is the net wage rate. In the case of a value-added tax regime, w identifies the
gross (= net) wage rate and (1 - t) the net price for the business firms.
From a relation between x (via 
w y ) and t, we derive the curve depicted in Figure 2.












What is the relevance of the Laffer curve for the design of economic policy?
Notwithstanding the fact that the curve is often used to explain the Leviathan
behavior of a revenue-maximizing bureaucracy, it is not a useful tool for the design of
economic policy. We are not able to gain any information about the optimal (or
efficient) size of the government sector. The optimal size of the government is simply
zero and the relevant tax rate is zero. This situation identifies the Keynesian
paradigm. Without evoking multiplier effects of discretionary government
expenditure, 
g x , there is no positive role for the government. This result is rather
paradoxical, if we realize that this type of model is the one enshrined in the standard
macro model. Let us therefore try a more promising avenue in order to justify the
policy relevance of the Laffer curve.
4. PRODUCTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY AND THE LAFFER CURVE
The Laffer curve as derived in the preceding section was based on the fact that the
level of employment was negatively related to the tax rate. The argument in this
section focuses on another structural aspect, namely the possibility of productive
government activity: the government produces a public good which may either
increase the utility of the representative consumer or enhance the productivity of the
private production sector.
5 To simplify, we first concentrate the analysis on the latter
factor, which operates as a productive infrastructure provided by the government. The
productive input is a government employment component,  y
g, to be separated from
the employment component in the private sector,  y
p. The government pays9
competitive wages, which have to be financed by raising taxes, i.e., income taxes. An
interesting aspect of this model as contrasted to the preceding discussion is that the
total employment level,  , R is given. Because a leisure-income trade-off remains
excluded, welfare may be measured by the production level available for the private
sector. The model reads as follows:
xz yf y z z f f
gp −= ′ > ′′ < ′ > ′′ < () () , , , , , 0 0 0 0 0 production function
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tx t z y f y y
gp g −− ′ = () ( ) ( ) , 1 0 government budget
Tt x −=0. tax revenues
Substituting the labor supply retains three of the four equations, which may be written
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The interesting question is whether  x as a function of  t has a regular maximum.
Assuming some regularity conditions of the functions involved, it is easy to
demonstrate that the maximum of the derived Laffer curve is located on the falling
range of the Laffer-type curve relating output to the tax rate.
Solving the linear two equations model for  dx as a function of  dt yields:
for )], )( ( [
1
f z f z y f z x
dt
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The above reduced-form derivative is equal to zero if  f z′ is equal to zf ′ . This is an
important efficiency condition (see Monissen [1999]): private production is
maximized if a marginal shift of employment from the private to the public sector has
no effect on output. We assume without proof that the second-order condition is also
fulfilled.
A simple model, as useful as it might be, for explaining some aspects of a
Leviathan government either in the form of revenue-maximizing bureaucracy or of a
surplus-maximizing selfish dictator has one serious conceptual disadvantage: because
a leisure-income trade-off remains excluded from the model, a selfish dictator could
set the tax rate equal to one and confiscate the total private production. This would be
a rational policy after maximizing private production by an appropriate allocation of10
labor to the two sectors. Thus, the shape of the Laffer curve only follows if we assume
that the budget is balanced, i.e., taxes will be raised to cover government expenses for
wages in the public sector.
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The qualitative properties of the results are similar to those which we will derive from
the extended model in the next section.
5. SOME LAFFER-TYPE CURVES
The final stage of our discussion of the Laffer curve is based on a model extending
the productive activity of the government to cover both the productive effect
discussed in the preceding section and a standard public good enhancing the utility of
the private sector. Thus, it seems appropriate to include a utility function with the
leisure-income trade-off in addition to the private and the public good. The structure
of the model is presented in an appendix. Some remarks are appropriate. The utility
function is now quasi-linear in leisure; thus, the labor supply function includes a
wealth term in the form of profits from the private business sector. To eliminate the
profit variable from the model, the private production function is linear in the private
employment level. Without further discussion we state the reduced-form equation
which can be easily derived because the equations of the model are all log-linear.










































Tax revenues are the product of the private production volume and the tax rate. Figure
4 depicts all three curves. Private production is maximized for a tax rate of 0.05,
national product is maximized for a higher rate of 0.16. As shown earlier, the Laffer
curve is maximized for a tax rate of 0.51, which identifies the falling range of the
Laffer-type curve for  x.11
A log-transformation of the Laffer-relation reads:


























Figure 4. Some Laffer-Type Curves
As a marginal observation we state that the utility level of a maximized NP is higher
as compared to maximized private output, x. This result differs from the one stated
earlier where private production proved to be the appropriate welfare measure. This
apparent contradiction is resolved if we recall that the earlier discussion excluded a
public good from the utility function. It may be evident that NP is the appropriate
measure if we want to cover the production of the public good in an indirect way.12
6. A REVENUE-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRACY
As in the case of the Phillips curve, the Laffer curve is a popular tool in shaping and
analyzing economic policy problems. In both cases a theoretical underpinning came
rather late after a long period of ad hoc theorizing. The Laffer curve is often used to
explain the behavior of a revenue-maximizing bureaucracy. However, it is our
understanding that the Laffer curve is a completely useless tool for economic policy
advice if either based on the ad hoc model or the labor market model because in both
cases the optimal size of government is zero. Thus, specific starting points on the
Laffer curve cannot be used to rationalize the behavior of a Leviathan government.
The situation is completely different if the Laffer curve can be derived from a Laffer-
type curve for output. Justifying the selfish behavior of an incumbent bureaucracy is
easy if there exists a multitude of Laffer-type curves, which may be difficult to
separate and assess empirically.
As mentioned at the beginning, the Laffer curve has provided an important
theoretical ingredient for the analysis of a revenue-maximizing bureaucracy. We
complete therefore the discussion by a brief analysis of a Leviathan government
which materializes in the form of a revenue-maximizing bureaucracy.
7 Starting from
the definition of tax revenues we write:










Upon substitution of the reduced-form solution for the public good, z, the function
reads:








From this function which states that the utility of the government depends negatively
on the tax rate and positively on the quantity of the public good, we may easily derive
standard indifference curves which have the elliptic shape marked by
UUU
ggg
012 , , . The efficiency line reproduces the reduced-form solution for the
public good as a function of the tax rate. The solution values for a revenue-
maximizing bureaucracy are  t = 051 . (indicating the maximum of the Laffer curve)
and  z = 121 . (see Figure 5).
The three concave curves earmarked by  UUU 012 ,, are derived from the utility
function of the model. This second-best solution identifies lower values for both the
tax rate and the quantity of the public good. The utility solution is thereby simplified
by a convenient property of our model namely that the employment level remains
constant under a second-best solution.13
Figure 5. The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat
7. SUMMARY
Superficial investigation of the literature confirms the impression that the Laffer curve
remains basically a suggestive ad hoc relation besides the fact that it is widely
referred to as a policy tool and a theoretical input for analyzing bureaucratic behavior.
If our interpretation is correct that the Laffer curve (as the Phillips curve) is the
geometrical expression of a reduced-form equation we are obliged to state the
underlying system. Because the Laffer curve is generally connected with standard
macroeconomic analysis it remains an unsatisfactory analytical tool because it tends
to conceal the fact that the optimal size of government is zero. In standard
macroeconomics the government has no useful role to play if we ignore the existence
of likewise unsatisfactory effects of government expenditures on employment via the
multiplier. The more traditional theoretical foundations of the Laffer curve may be
based on employment effects via tax effects on the net wage rate. Based on such
considerations the relation between the tax base and the tax rate has a uniform
negative slope throughout. Only by focusing on the productive role of government
this relation does take a Laffer-type shape. Maximizing the Laffer curve results in a
tax rate that is higher than the one maximizing the tax base or any other welfare
indicator. The tax base and the tax revenues are related by a familiar elasticity
condition. In this more complex world it is easy for an incumbent bureaucracy to
conceal its true preferences by pretending to maximize the welfare of society.14
APPENDIX
The structure of the model underlying the extended discussion of the Laffer curve
reads as follows (see Monissen, [1999]):
Ux z R y R
w =++ − = ln ln ( ), , with 3 (1)
wy x
w += 0( 2 )
11
wx
= ,( 3 )
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The eight independent equations allow determining the eight endogenous variables,
, ) , , , , , , , ( π z w x y y y U
g p w  in terms of the tax rate, t. These are the reduced-form
equations of the model.
* The author thanks Bettina Monissen for helpful assistance.
1 The Buchanan-Lee model has become a standard reference in the public choice – public finance
literature, cf. John Cullis and Philip Jones (1998).
2 For an interesting historical inspection of Laffer’s idea, cf. Robert Kaleher and William
Orzechowski (1982). Needless to emphasize, Stigler’s Law applies in the case of the Laffer curve, too.
3 See the early discussion by Victor A. Canto, Douglas H. Joines, and Robert J. Webb (1982).
Similar theoretical considerations substantiate the analysis by James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee
(1982a and 1982b).
4 This source is quoted in Simon P. Anderson, André de Palma, and Jacques-Francois Thisse
(1992). I owe this reference to my colleague Norbert Schulz.
5 The following discussion is based on Hans G. Monissen (1985, 1999) and Ronald Findlay and
John D. Wilson (1987). As a general reference to the modern theory of economic growth where similar
production functions are used, compare Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995).
6 Because the public good is parametrically included, economics of scale may result without
suspending the assumptions for a competitive equilibrium, see Chipman (1970).
7 The following analysis is based on Monissen (1999).15
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